

A Description of the MISTY1 Encryption Algorithm

Status of this Memo

This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

This document describes a secret-key cryptosystem MISTY1, which is block cipher with a 128-bit key, a 64-bit block and a variable number of rounds. It documents the algorithm description including key scheduling part and data randomizing part.

1. Introduction

This document describes a secret-key cryptosystem MISTY1, which is block cipher with a 128-bit key, a 64-bit block and a variable number of rounds. It is designed on the basis of the theory of provable security against differential and linear cryptanalysis, and moreover it realizes high-speed encryption on hardware platforms as well as on software environments. As the result of weighing strength and speed, 8-rounds of MISTY1 is recommended and used in most cases.

Our implementation shows that MISTY1 with eight rounds can encrypt a data stream in CBC mode at a speed of 57Mbps and 40Mbps on Pentium II/266MHz and PA-7200/120MHz, respectively. For its hardware performance, we have produced a prototype LSI by a process of 0.8-micron CMOS gate-array and confirmed a speed of 512Mbps.

2. Algorithm Description

Algorithm [1] could be divided into two parts, namely "key scheduling part" and "data randomizing part". Key scheduling part takes a 128-bit input key and produces a 128-bit expanded key. Data randomizing

part takes a 64-bit input data and mixes it, namely encryption. If data randomizing part is processed in reverse order, mixed data is transformed to input data, namely decryption.

2.1 Terminology

Some operators are used in this document to describe the algorithm. The operator '+' indicates two's complement addition. The operator '*' indicates multiplication. The operator '/' yields the quotient, and the operator '%' yields the remainder from the division. The operator '&' indicates bitwise AND operation. The operator '|' indicates bitwise inclusive OR operation. The operator '^' indicates bitwise exclusive OR operation. The operator '<<' indicates bitwise left shift operation. The operator '>>' indicates bitwise right shift operation.

2.2 Key Scheduling Part

Key scheduling part consists of the following operations.

```
for i = 0, ..., 7 do
    EK[i] = K[i*2]*256 + K[i*2+1];
for i = 0, ..., 7 do
begin
    EK[i+ 8] = FI(EK[i], EK[(i+1)%8]);
    EK[i+16] = EK[i+8] & 0x1fff;
    EK[i+24] = EK[i+8] >> 9;
end
```

K is an input key, and each element of K, namely K[i], holds an 8-bit of the key, respectively. EK denotes an expanded key, and each element of EK, namely EK[i], holds a 16-bit of the expanded key. Input data of K[0], ..., K[15] are copied to EK[0], ..., EK[7]. Expanded key is produced from EK[0], ..., EK[7] by using function FI, and stored in EK[8], ..., EK[15]. Function FI is described in the following section.

2.3 Data Randomizing Part

Data randomizing part uses two kinds of function, which are called function FO and function FL. Function FO calls another function, namely FI. The key expansion part also uses function FI. Function FI uses two S-boxes, namely S7, S9. Each function is described as follows.

Function FO takes two parameters. One is a 32-bit width input data, namely FO_IN. The other is an index of EK, namely k. And FO returns a 32-bit width data, namely FO_OUT.

```

FO(FO_IN, k)
begin
  var t0, t1 as 16-bit integer;
  t0 = FO_IN >> 16;
  t1 = FO_IN & 0xffff;
  t0 = t0 ^ EK[k];
  t0 = FI(t0, EK[(k+5)%8+8]);
  t0 = t0 ^ t1;
  t1 = t1 ^ EK[(k+2)%8];
  t1 = FI(t1, EK[(k+1)%8+8]);
  t1 = t1 ^ t0;
  t0 = t0 ^ EK[(k+7)%8];
  t0 = FI(t0, EK[(k+3)%8+8]);
  t0 = t0 ^ t1;
  t1 = t1 ^ EK[(k+4)%8];
  FO_OUT = (t1<<16) | t0;
  return FO_OUT;
end.

```

Function FI takes two parameters. One is a 16-bit width input data, namely FI_IN. The other is a part of EK, namely FI_KEY, which is also 16-bit width. And FI returns a 16-bit width data, namely FI_OUT.

```

FI(FI_IN, FI_KEY)
begin
  var d9 as 9-bit integer;
  var d7 as 7-bit integer;
  d9 = FI_IN >> 7;
  d7 = FI_IN & 0x7f;
  d9 = S9TABLE[d9] ^ d7;
  d7 = S7TABLE[d7] ^ d9;
  ( d7 = d7 & 0x7f; )
  d7 = d7 ^ (FI_KEY >> 9);
  d9 = d9 ^ (FI_KEY & 0x1ff);
  d9 = S9TABLE[d9] ^ d7;
  FI_OUT = (d7<<9) | d9;
  return FI_OUT;
end.

```

S7TABLE and S9TABLE denote the S-boxes S7 and S9 respectively in terms of look up table notation. Here are the description of S7TABLE and S9TABLE in hexadecimal notation.

S7TABLE:

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	e	f
00:	1b	32	33	5a	3b	10	17	54	5b	1a	72	73	6b	2c	66	49
10:	1f	24	13	6c	37	2e	3f	4a	5d	0f	40	56	25	51	1c	04
20:	0b	46	20	0d	7b	35	44	42	2b	1e	41	14	4b	79	15	6f
30:	0e	55	09	36	74	0c	67	53	28	0a	7e	38	02	07	60	29
40:	19	12	65	2f	30	39	08	68	5f	78	2a	4c	64	45	75	3d
50:	59	48	03	57	7c	4f	62	3c	1d	21	5e	27	6a	70	4d	3a
60:	01	6d	6e	63	18	77	23	05	26	76	00	31	2d	7a	7f	61
70:	50	22	11	06	47	16	52	4e	71	3e	69	43	34	5c	58	7d

S9TABLE:

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	a	b	c	d	e	f
000:	1c3	0cb	153	19f	1e3	0e9	0fb	035	181	0b9	117	1eb	133	009	02d	0d3
010:	0c7	14a	037	07e	0eb	164	193	1d8	0a3	11e	055	02c	01d	1a2	163	118
020:	14b	152	1d2	00f	02b	030	13a	0e5	111	138	18e	063	0e3	0c8	1f4	01b
030:	001	09d	0f8	1a0	16d	1f3	01c	146	07d	0d1	082	1ea	183	12d	0f4	19e
040:	1d3	0dd	1e2	128	1e0	0ec	059	091	011	12f	026	0dc	0b0	18c	10f	1f7
050:	0e7	16c	0b6	0f9	0d8	151	101	14c	103	0b8	154	12b	1ae	017	071	00c
060:	047	058	07f	1a4	134	129	084	15d	19d	1b2	1a3	048	07c	051	1ca	023
070:	13d	1a7	165	03b	042	0da	192	0ce	0c1	06b	09f	1f1	12c	184	0fa	196
080:	1e1	169	17d	031	180	10a	094	1da	186	13e	11c	060	175	1cf	067	119
090:	065	068	099	150	008	007	17c	0b7	024	019	0de	127	0db	0e4	1a9	052
0a0:	109	090	19c	1c1	028	1b3	135	16a	176	0df	1e5	188	0c5	16e	1de	1b1
0b0:	0c3	1df	036	0ee	1ee	0f0	093	049	09a	1b6	069	081	125	00b	05e	0b4
0c0:	149	1c7	174	03e	13b	1b7	08e	1c6	0ae	010	095	1ef	04e	0f2	1fd	085
0d0:	0fd	0f6	0a0	16f	083	08a	156	09b	13c	107	167	098	1d0	1e9	003	1fe
0e0:	0bd	122	089	0d2	18f	012	033	06a	142	0ed	170	11b	0e2	14f	158	131
0f0:	147	05d	113	1cd	079	161	1a5	179	09e	1b4	0cc	022	132	01a	0e8	004
100:	187	1ed	197	039	1bf	1d7	027	18b	0c6	09c	0d0	14e	06c	034	1f2	06e
110:	0ca	025	0ba	191	0fe	013	106	02f	1ad	172	1db	0c0	10b	1d6	0f5	1ec
120:	10d	076	114	1ab	075	10c	1e4	159	054	11f	04b	0c4	1be	0f7	029	0a4
130:	00e	1f0	077	04d	17a	086	08b	0b3	171	0bf	10e	104	097	15b	160	168
140:	0d7	0bb	066	1ce	0fc	092	1c5	06f	016	04a	0a1	139	0af	0f1	190	00a
150:	1aa	143	17b	056	18d	166	0d4	1fb	14d	194	19a	087	1f8	123	0a7	1b8
160:	141	03c	1f9	140	02a	155	11a	1a1	198	0d5	126	1af	061	12e	157	1dc
170:	072	18a	0aa	096	115	0ef	045	07b	08d	145	053	05f	178	0b2	02e	020
180:	1d5	03f	1c9	1e7	1ac	044	038	014	0b1	16b	0ab	0b5	05a	182	1c8	1d4
190:	018	177	064	0cf	06d	100	199	130	15a	005	120	1bb	1bd	0e0	04f	0d6
1a0:	13f	1c4	12a	015	006	0ff	19b	0a6	043	088	050	15f	1e8	121	073	17e
1b0:	0bc	0c2	0c9	173	189	1f5	074	1cc	1e6	1a8	195	01f	041	00d	1ba	032
1c0:	03d	1d1	080	0a8	057	1b9	162	148	0d9	105	062	07a	021	1ff	112	108
1d0:	1c0	0a9	11d	1b0	1a6	0cd	0f3	05c	102	05b	1d9	144	1f6	0ad	0a5	03a
1e0:	1cb	136	17f	046	0e1	01e	1dd	0e6	137	1fa	185	08c	08f	040	1b5	0be
1f0:	078	000	0ac	110	15e	124	002	1bc	0a2	0ea	070	1fc	116	15c	04c	1c2

Function FL takes two parameters. One is a 32-bit data, namely FL_IN. The other is an index of EK, namely k. And FL returns a 32-bit width data, namely FL_OUT.

```

FL(FL_IN, k)
begin
  var d0, d1 as 16-bit integer;
  d0 = FL_IN >> 16;
  d1 = FL_IN & 0xffff;
  if (k is an even number) then
    d1 = d1 ^ (d0 & EK[k/2]);
    d0 = d0 ^ (d1 | EK[(k/2+6)%8+8]);
  else
    d1 = d1 ^ (d0 & EK[((k-1)/2+2)%8+8]);
    d0 = d0 ^ (d1 | EK[((k-1)/2+4)%8]);
  endif
  FL_OUT = (d0<<16) | d1;
  return FL_OUT;
end.

```

When the algorithm is used for decryption, function FLINV is used instead of function FL.

```

FLINV(FL_IN, k)
begin
  var d0, d1 as 16-bit integer;
  d0 = FL_IN >> 16;
  d1 = FL_IN & 0xffff;
  if (k is an even number) then
    d0 = d0 ^ (d1 | EK[(k/2+6)%8+8]);
    d1 = d1 ^ (d0 & EK[k/2]);
  else
    d0 = d0 ^ (d1 | EK[((k-1)/2+4)%8]);
    d1 = d1 ^ (d0 & EK[((k-1)/2+2)%8+8]);
  endif
  FL_OUT = (d0<<16) | d1;
  return FL_OUT;
end.

```

In most cases, data randomizing part consists of 8 "rounds". Round contains the call of function FO. Additionally, even-number round includes the calls of function FL. After the final round, FLs are called again. The detail description is as follows.

64-bit plaintext P is divided into the leftmost 32-bit D0 and the rightmost 32-bit D1.

```
// 0 round
D0 = FL(D0, 0);
D1 = FL(D1, 1);
D1 = D1 ^ FO(D0, 0);
// 1 round
D0 = D0 ^ FO(D1, 1);
// 2 round
D0 = FL(D0, 2);
D1 = FL(D1, 3);
D1 = D1 ^ FO(D0, 2);
// 3 round
D0 = D0 ^ FO(D1, 3);
// 4 round
D0 = FL(D0, 4);
D1 = FL(D1, 5);
D1 = D1 ^ FO(D0, 4);
// 5 round
D0 = D0 ^ FO(D1, 5);
// 6 round
D0 = FL(D0, 6);
D1 = FL(D1, 7);
D1 = D1 ^ FO(D0, 6);
// 7 round
D0 = D0 ^ FO(D1, 7);
// final
D0 = FL(D0, 8);
D1 = FL(D1, 9);
```

64-bit ciphertext C is constructed from D0 and D1 as following operation.

```
C = (D1<<32) | D0;
```

When data randomizing part is used as decrypting operation, it should be executed in reverse order. The detail description is as follows.

```
D0 = C & 0xffffffff;
D1 = C >> 32;
D0 = FLINV(D0, 8);
D1 = FLINV(D1, 9);
D0 = D0 ^ FO(D1, 7);
D1 = D1 ^ FO(D0, 6);
D0 = FLINV(D0, 6);
D1 = FLINV(D1, 7);
D0 = D0 ^ FO(D1, 5);
D1 = D1 ^ FO(D0, 4);
D0 = FLINV(D0, 4);
D1 = FLINV(D1, 5);
```

```
D0 = D0 ^ FO(D1, 3);
D1 = D1 ^ FO(D0, 2);
D0 = FLINV(D0, 2);
D1 = FLINV(D1, 3);
D0 = D0 ^ FO(D1, 1);
D1 = D1 ^ FO(D0, 0);
D0 = FLINV(D0, 0);
D1 = FLINV(D1, 1);
P = (D0<<32) | D1;
```

3. Object Identifier

The Object Identifier for MISTY1 in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode is as follows:

```
MISTY1-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
  {iso(1) member-body(2) jisc(392)
   mitsubishi-electric-corporation(200011) isl(61) security(1)
   algorithm(1) symmetric-encryption-algorithm(1) misty1-cbc(1)}
```

MISTY1-CBC needs Initialization Vector (IV) as like as other algorithms, such as DES-CBC, DES-EDE3-CBC and so on. To determine the value of IV, MISTY1-CBC takes parameter as:

```
MISTY1-CBC Parameter ::= IV
```

where IV ::= OCTET STRING -- 8 octets.

When this Object Identifier is used, plaintext is padded before encrypt it. At least 1 padding octet is appended at the end of the plaintext to make the length of the plaintext to the multiple of 8 octets. The value of these octets is as same as the number of appended octets. (e.g., If 5 octets are needed to pad, the value is 0x05.)

4. Security Considerations

The algorithm, which is described in this document, is designed in consideration of the theory of provable security against differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis [2][3][4]. According to the recent result, when the algorithm consists of 8 rounds, both differential characteristic probability and liner characteristic probability are 2^{-140} . For reference, probabilities of DES are 2^{-62} and 2^{-46} , respectively.

5. Legal Issues

The algorithm description is applied for a patent in several countries as PCT/JP96/02154. However, the algorithm is freely available for academic (non-profit) use. Additionally, the algorithm can be used for commercial use without paying the patent fee if you contract with Mitsubishi Electric Corporation. For more information, please contact at MISTY@isl.melco.co.jp.

6. References

- [1] M. Matsui, "New Block Encryption Algorithm MISTY", Fast Software Encryption - 4th International Workshop (FSE'97), LNCS 1267, Springer Verlag, 1997, pp.54-68
- [2] K. Nyberg and L.R. Knudsen, "Provable Security Against a Differential Attack", Journal of Cryptology, Vol.8, No.1, 1995, pp. 27-37
- [3] K. Nyberg, "Linear Approximation of Block Ciphers", Advances in Cryptology - Eurocrypt'94, LNCS 950, Springer Verlag, 1995, pp.439-444
- [4] M. Matsui, "New Structure of Block Ciphers with Provable Security Against Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis", Fast Software Encryption - Third International Workshop, LNCS 1039, Springer Verlag, 1996, pp.205-218

7. Authors' Addresses

Hidenori Ohta
Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Information Technology R&D Center
5-1-1 Ofuna, Kamakura, Kanagawa 247-8501, Japan

Phone: +81-467-41-2183
Fax: +81-467-41-2185
EMail: hidenori@iss.isl.melco.co.jp

Mitsuru Matsui
Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Information Technology R&D Center
5-1-1 Ofuna, Kamakura, Kanagawa 247-8501, Japan

Phone: +81-467-41-2181
Fax: +81-467-41-2185
EMail: matsui@iss.isl.melco.co.jp

Appendix A. Example Data of MISTY1

Here is an example ciphertext of MISTY1 when the key and the plaintext are set as following value.

```
Key:          00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 aa bb cc dd ee ff
Plaintext:    01 23 45 67 89 ab cd ef fe dc ba 98 76 54 32 10
Ciphertext:   8b 1d a5 f5 6a b3 d0 7c 04 b6 82 40 b1 3b e9 5d
```

In the above example, because the plaintext has a length of 128-bit, MISTY1 is used two times to each 64-bit, namely ECB mode.

Following example is ciphertext of MISTY1 in CBC mode.

```
Key:          00 11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 aa bb cc dd ee ff
IV:           01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
Plaintext:    01 23 45 67 89 ab cd ef fe dc ba 98 76 54 32 10
Ciphertext:   46 1c 1e 87 9c 18 c2 7f b9 ad f2 d8 0c 89 03 1f
```

Full Copyright Statement

Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved.

This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than English.

The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.

This document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Acknowledgement

Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the Internet Society.

